United Nations Security Council
x
International Atomic Energy Association
United Nations Security Council
x
International Atomic Energy Association
Table of Contents
Suvd-Erdene Gandush
Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen.
My name is G.Suvd-Erdene and I am honored to serve as your Chair in the Tomujin Alternative School Model United Nations 2026 (TASMUN). This will be my twelfth model UN conference, therefore my aim is to provide a challenging yet enjoyable and memorable experience for all of you. I cannot wait to meet my delegates and hear all the unique perspectives you will bring to our council sessions. Amidst the stress of research and heated debates, remember this is an academic conference aimed for building social interaction and diplomatic reasoning. Come well prepared, remember to have fun within the chaos, and as the saying goes, “keep your friends close but your enemies closer” - Michael Corleone (The Godfather II 1974).
I wish you all luck and hope to provide the best experience within our committee. See you all there!
Suvd-Erdene Gandush
UNSC x IAEA Chair
Tomujin Alternative School Model United Nations 2026
Ayas Aldarmaa
Dear esteemed delegates,
My name is Ayas and I have the pleasure to be serving as your Co-Chair for Advanced 2, UNSC x IAEA, at TASMUN 2026. I am absolutely delighted to be introducing this new form of mixed council committee, which combines the political urgency of international security with the technical responsibility of nuclear oversight. Designed for our most experienced delegates, this committee will require strategic thinking, test your adaptability, and have you weigh both diplomatic negotiation and scientific accountability.
Throughout the conference, delegates will be challenged to engage in fast-paced, substantive debate while balancing national interests with global security concerns. The DAIS will be committed to fostering a professional and dynamic environment that encourages both rigorous discussion and innovative solutions. We look forward to welcoming you to a rewarding and intellectually engaging committee experience.
Sincerely
Ayas Aldarmaa
UNSC x IAEA Co-Chair
Tomujin Alternative School Model United Nations 2026
Committee introduction
The UNSC x IAEA council will serve as TASMUN 2026’s premier second advanced committee, bringing together the political authority of the United Nations Security council and the technical mandates of the International Atomic Energy Agency. UNSC x IAEA is a multi-resolution committee with fast-paced discussions through diplomatic reasoning, where negotiation as well as thorough research will be necessary for success.
This joint body not only operates under the realm of a security council, but also under various UN treaties and/or conferences that shape international law as we know it. Delegates will be required to engage with the legal frameworks of non-proliferation, safeguards and verification mechanisms, compliance assessments, and enforcement measures, all while navigating the broader geopolitical implications of nuclear policy decisions.
Unlike traditional committees, the UNSC x IAEA demands both political awareness and technical precision. Delegates must think critically about sovereignty, regional security, violation based sanctions and potential crisis escalation. Success will depend on the ability to respond to evolving developments with clarity and composure.
The UNSC x IAEA is designed for delegates prepared to engage at a professional standard, where every word you say is measured with intention, diplomacy is deliberate, analysis is precise, and decisions carry global consequences.
Country Allocations
China
France
India
Iran
Israel
Myanmar
North Korea
Pakistan
Palestine
Russia
South Korea
Syria
UK
Ukraine
USA
Committee Topic
The global Non-Proliferation of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
For decades following the Cold War, the global community came to a fragile yet steadfast consensus that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) presented an existential threat to humanity, one that could be catastrophic if left uncontained. Through utilization of international law, agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) kept weapons of mass destruction from being manufactured, acquired and sold. Further enforced through UN bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a set of rules, norms and institutions designed to curb the spread of the world’s most deadly arms was established with thorough processes in place for verification. Today, this foundational consensus unravels as the twin forces of rapid technological disruption and significant geopolitical shifts test the resilience of international law, exposing critical gaps between legal proscriptions and enforceable reality. While the idea of controlling WMDs and its spread is strong, the operational efficiency and political legitimacy of these treaties are being undermined, risking a new era of uncontrolled proliferation.
While these safeguarding measures worked well under a period of U.S hegemony and U.S-Russian cooperation, which served as a driving force in facilitating threat reduction and, to an extent, arms control, increasing geopolitical tensions within regions threaten to shatter that fragile consensus. The return of great power competitions between the P5, such as Russia and China’s adversarial attitude to the West, and regional conflict such as the genocide of Gaza, erosion of governance in south Asia and guerrilla military coups in Africa has effectively forced the multilateral institutions that enforced non-proliferation to a halt. Increasing tensions and decreasing cooperation efforts fosters international distrust between nations, regions and even whole continents.
The world has entered a new age of crisis with constant ongoing interstate and intrastate conflict taking the main spotlight with detrimental consequences. Humanitarian needs are at an all time high with millions displaced and more surviving in less than livable conditions. The added threat of WMDs playing a significant role in these conflicts is an added factor of fear, that without the proper control and proper execution needed to secure a peaceful standpoint then everything the world has worked so hard to regain post WWII will be reversed.
Resistance:
Several states have historically denied the full scope of global WMD non-proliferation, often citing national security reasons or regional threat perceptions. Resistance to WMD non-proliferation has come in many forms, from outright violations of active treaties to resistance to implementing emerging agreements. In the Middle East, Iran and Israel become the main point of resistance as they allegedly build independent nuclear programs despite either being signatories of the NPT or not declaring any nuclear arsenal. In South Asia, Pakistan and India, who have remained outside jurisdiction of the NPT, are basically de facto nuclear-armed states with North Korea famously resisting in the East.
In 1994, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) started an intensive process of negotiations to draft the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, a result of the LTBT’s legal gaps. It has yet to be implemented as nine of the 44 Annex 2 states, countries which are crucial in the agreement of the CTBT, have either refused or resisted ratification (see Table 1). While most states supported the CTBT immediately upon its draft, some nuclear-states have resisted signing the treaty probably due to the massive restrictions it would have on independent state nuclear programs. Countries like India and Pakistan, who are not members of the NPT, have declined the CTBT as it could make any improvement on nuclear-weapon building impossible to track without proper testing. Unsurprisingly, nuclear states like the U.S, Russia, China and North Korea, who are (or were) member states of the NPT, have also resisted the CTBT possibly due to similar reasons. Interestingly, Iran and Israel, which reportedly does not have any declared or official nuclear programs, have also resisted despite denying offensive nuclear systems in place, raising questions for the international community.
On top of the lack of global cooperation to disarm nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapon disarmament is also facing a widespread challenge. The BWC which already faced weaknesses from lack of verification protocols, now faces a massive threat from synthetic biology. We’ve gone so far past the technological capabilities once believed possible in the 20th century we have completely overtaken the mechanisms of peace established through our evolution. Synthetic biology, a field of study in which biological organisms are edited and engineered for specific purposes, directly undermines the control within BWC. CRISPR gene editing, DNA synthesizers and freely shared genomic data lowers the barrier of entry for manipulating pathogens, potentially enabling state and non-state actors to engineer biological agents in labs no larger than a garage. We have so outstandingly surpassed all expectations we’ve come to a new era of prolific risk. Every leap we make in the medical field, every advancement in biological and chemical research, newly discovered physics and mathematical formulas are so accessible we risk them slipping through loopholes of regulation and landing in the wrong hands. This makes the BWC’s reliance on national declarations and gentlemanly cooperation between states nearly impossible to ensure.
Violations & Concerns:
In March of 2018, Salisbury, South-West England, former Russian agent Sergei Skripal evaded an assisination attempt carried out through a fast-acting nerve agent called Novichok, or “newcomer”. It’s believed that Putin orchestrated an assasination attempt on Skripal because the ex-spy was helping western officials by giving them sensitive information on Putin’s “criminal embezzlement” involvement, despite his retirement status. Similarly in 2020, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was poisoned on his flight over Siberia, however Russian officials and healthcare providers at the scene have denied any foul play. It was discovered after further treatment at a Berlin clinic, Navalny was poisoned with the same nerve agent attempted on Skripal. Russia’s use of prohibited materials and equipment under BWC and CWC sanctions don’t just stop at operations for national interest.
Relating to the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukraine first reported Russia’s use of industrial chemicals in 2022. Allegations continued and resurfaced in 2023 when a battalion commander claimed to have dropped grenades containing chemical warfare agents on Ukrainian soldiers. In 2024, Russia continued to acquire materials for its chemical-warfare programme, the Scientific Research Institute for Applied Chemistry purchasing pyrotechnic moderators and was accused by the U.S for using banned chemicals. Although Russia has continuously either flat out denied or stayed silent about these allegations, with previous history of biological and chemical weapons use under clandestine operations, it makes Russia one of the most prolific violators of anti-WMD steps taken. Despite being a key negotiator in the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia continues to radically weaponize itself with riot control agents and asphyxiating gases like tear gas, further feeding into the reality that chemical proliferation is still a major international concern.
Other instances of malicious biological agent use includes the assassination of Kim Jong nam, the current DPRK leader’s older half brother in 2017. Kim Jong Nam was poisoned using a nerve agent later known as XV, one of the deadliest in the world with a fast activation component. In Syria the use of chemical agents remains a contentious effort to disarm, with 26 unresolved issues including inaccurate declaration and evidence of over 100 other sites potentially being used for chemical weapons. Investigation in the middle east by the OPCW, not only in Syria but also Iran have been postponed on numerous occasions due to airstrikes over the region by Israel in their conflict with Gaza. Not only does Israel face their own allegations of using white phosphorus, a highly toxic chemical that spontaneously combusts when exposed to oxygen, but they are actively obstructing ongoing OPCW investigations.
At the same time, China emerges as a rising competitor in the arms race. It’s known China is pursuing a rapid buildup of nuclear weapons, their current stockpile of warheads sitting at an estimated 600 with a rise up to 1,500 in 2035. China operates under an opaque screen of ambiguity, purposefully leaving information out of the public’s eye for secrecy. China’s involvement only serves to complicate traditional arms race control models, creating a trifecta of power struggles instead of a binary conflict. The power rift between these three stops the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from passing resolutions that would actually make a difference. Vetoes from Russia, China or the United States routinely block action proposed against violators, as seen in repeated deadlocked decisions about Syria’s chemical weapon use or North Korean missile tests. When the UN’s top body is rendered ineffective, the message is clear, that violations will face no collective consequence and that the associated international law is optional.
Conclusion:
With the technological capabilities of the 21st century, we risk not only regional mass casualties but global scale eradication if events like WWIII were to happen. Technology is not a neutral force, it's an inherently disruptive one that is working both for the evolution of humanity and its potential downfall. It empowers smaller actors to resist, undermines verification and creates threats that exploit the slow moving nature of international governance. While technology is indeed a tool for better detection and monitoring, it's a double edged sword that sways the balance between defensive measure and offensive attacks. The existing treaties, built for a slower, more tangible world have been outgrown by decades. To remain relevant, the international community must move beyond outdated control methods and work towards transparency. The alternative is a future where the technological capabilities to create mass destruction slowly grows, becomes more accessible, and surpasses any treaty meant to contain it, returning the world to an era of fear and sorrow we promised never to see again.
Committee specific rules
All members of the P5 (USA, China, Russia, UK and France), in the event of a veto on a substantive resolution will trigger a mandatory and automatic 10 minute UNGA style debate. The P5 member who has vetoed the resolution will have to defend their stance, answer questions from fellow delegates and give a reasonable solution for their veto. In the event a P5 cannot properly and reasonably defend their stance, or creates a deadlock, the decision will go to the UNGA board and dais will force a decision. (Remember that an abstention will not count as a veto, if a delegate chooses to abstain from substantive voting procedure then they will forfeit their input in the matter.)
According to A/RES/377-A, adopted in November of 1950, member states should not and can not block the General Assembly from taking action. Therefore if a P5 veto triggers a UNGA debate, member states are not allowed to prevent the GA from taking any and all actions necessary to reach a resolution. Therefore, the UNGA council (in this case the DAIS will take first command) is given final responsibility for maintaining peace and may reach a compromise/solution without the input of the P5 with 2/3rds majority (a member of the P5 cannot veto a GA decision).
Events to consider/ General Guideline
UNSC x IAEA joint operation, IAEA safeguarding measures have been given full power to investigate along with the UNSG Mechanism and OPCW investigative protocols. The committee will be addressing these specific instances of violation and come up with appropriate treaties/agreements:
Israel’s use of white phosphorus against Palestine
Russia’s 11,000 recorded instances of chemical weapons use against Ukraine
Syrian government forces using chemical weapons against Syrian civilians
Assassination of Kim Jong-nam in 2017 using VX by Kim Jong-un
Russia’s use of the Novichok agent (newcomer) to assassinate opposition agents in 2018 and 2020
China’s opaque stockpiling, the significant increase in numbers from 2019 to 2025 (290-600)
Relevant treaties of discussion are:
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) FULL INSTALLMENT
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) FULL INSTALLMENT
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) FULL INSTALLMENT
If marked INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES then these are the treaties the committee will be following to distinguish violations and ensure accountability. If marked FULL INSTALLMENT then these are the treaties the committee will work towards fully installing into effect (by passing them or getting the P5 to sign)
Relevant Treaties/Mechanisms
WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction, biological, chemical or nuclear weaponry that could cause large scale damage or casualties upon detonation) ex. Nuclear missiles, weaponized smallpox, nerve agents.
CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) A multilateral treaty banning chemical weapons (not only the use of it, but the existence itself) and requiring their destruction in a specified amount of time.
NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) a landmark international treaty that aims to prevent the spread of nuclear programs, save use of nuclear energy and eventual nuclear disarmament.
LTBT (Limited Test Ban Treaty 1963) The ban of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and underwater.
CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) prohibits all nuclear test explosions, including underground testing.
BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) prohibits the development, production, use, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of biological weapons such as nerve/blood agents.
Geneva Protocol (1925) prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons (asphyxiating gases, weaponized disease, etc) in armed warfare.
UNSGM (United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism), carries out investigations in response to allegations of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons that violate the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Closing Remarks
As of 2026 we live in a world of constant geopolitical and technological tensions. As an evolving global community, it is not only our job to be aware of our rights as individuals but advocate for the blatant disregard for safety the world powers are heralding. Not only is this committee a security council, it’s also a mechanism of containment on its own. Here your voices will be heard, valued and carefully considered. As delegates of UNSC x IAEA you will be put under high pressure, but the fruits of your labor will be rewarding.
Whether you are a novice at MUNs or read political journals like a madman in your downtime, this committee offers everyone a new perspective and an opportunity to reach higher achievements. This handbook was written specifically to encourage students to research not only your country allocations but the political state of the current world as we know it.
We look forward to hearing your remarks, arguments and wild takes. Please feel free to reach out to your DAIS for any questions, and research your topic well. It is our pleasure to serve as your guides through the treacherous waters of global security.